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Abstract 
University rankings as developed by the media are used by many stakeholders in higher 
education: students looking for university places; academics looking for university jobs; 
university managers who need to maintain standing in the competitive arena of student 
recruitment; and governments who want to know that public funds spent on universities are 
delivering a world class higher education system. Media rankings deliberately draw attention 
to the performance of each university relative to all others, and as such they are undeniably 
simple to use and interpret. But one danger is that they are potentially open to manipulation 
and gaming because many of the measures underlying the rankings are under the control of the 
institutions themselves. This paper examines media rankings (constructed from an 
amalgamation of variables representing performance across numerous dimensions) to reveal 
the problems with using a composite index to reflect overall performance. It ends with a 
proposal for an alternative methodology which leads to groupings rather than point estimates. 
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University rankings: What do they really show? 
1. Introduction 
University rankings are often constructed by commercial publishers and are lists of higher 
education institutions (HEIs), presented in the format of a league table based on performance, 
which in turn is derived from a set of underlying quantitative data (Usher and Medow 2009). 
Rankings draw attention to relative performance, and are often aimed at the general public, for 
example, prospective students (and their parents) to help them choose a university. In recent 
years, however, rankings of HEIs have increased and their usage has expanded: it is now 
common for (prospective) students, staff and HEI managers to resort to these when making 
important decisions or managerial policies.1 
In the international arena, although many rankings exist, three popular ones are: 
 The Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) compiled annually by 
the Shanghai Jiao Tong University since 2003; 
 The QS World University Rankings of the world's top universities produced 
by Quacquarelli Symonds published annually since 2004; 
 The Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings, produced and 
published annually since 2004, and in partnership with Thomson Reuters since 2010.  
Two additional ones are also worthy of note as they differ slightly from those listed above. 
Universitas 21 provides a ranking of countries’ higher education systems (rather than the 
individual universities), and U-Multirank allows users to produce their own rankings based on 
their own preferences (rather than fixed weightings imposed by the publication); the theme of 
preferences will be picked up again later. 
                                                          
1 Note that there is some evidence that they might be instrumental in determining VC pay, for example Allcock 
et al. (2017). 
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Within countries, national media also provide rankings of their domestic HEIs. Although there 
were some early attempts to rank US universities or disciplines within them using, for example, 
the biographical dictionary of academics (Cattell 1906) and ratings of graduate programs in the 
USA as evaluated by faculty (Hughes 1925), the first serious media rankings of universities 
and colleges (at the institution level) appeared in the USA in US News and World Report in 
1983 (Dill 2009).2 Since 1994, the publication of university rankings based on various 
individual measures of performance has become commonplace in the UK, USA and elsewhere 
(Yorke 1997). In the UK, for example, The Times, Sunday Times and The Guardian all publish 
their own university rankings, while The Independent produces The Complete University 
Guide.  
While rankings have generally been aimed at external stakeholders such as prospective 
students, interest in and usage of media rankings has broadened to institutions themselves 
(possibly as an internal auditing tool) and to governments, especially with the regular 
publication of global rankings of universities. So important have rankings become to all higher 
education stakeholders that ‘Rankings – both national and international – have not just captured 
the imagination of higher education but in some ways have captured higher education itself.’ 
(Bekhradnia 2016, p3).  
The possibility that universities are altering behaviour in order to climb the league tables is 
potentially worrying. HEIs should be developing their behaviour around social priorities. If 
these do not align with the priorities encouraged by media rankings, this suggests a deviation 
from what is socially optimal (Muller 2017). It is therefore important to understand the 
principles underlying the compilation of university rankings. 
                                                          
2 One could argue that the tables of performance produced in the Financial Times in the UK were also forerunners to the media 
rankings we see today. These covered distinct aspects such as: achievement rates (Dixon 1976); labour market destinations 
(Dixon 1985); and completion rates (Dixon 1989). 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine and critically evaluate the methodological approach 
underpinning the construction of university rankings which essentially involves calculating a 
composite index from an array of data. Of particular interest is whether a single measure can 
truly reflect overall performance across a variety of production activities (relating to teaching 
and research). Further attention is directed at just how precisely rankings illustrate 
performance, and also how the methodology underpinning the construction of media rankings 
can incentivise certain behaviours of HEIs. This leads to the proposal of an alternative approach 
to assessing universities. The analysis and review presented here are of interest to (prospective) 
students, managers and policy-makers in higher education sectors internationally. 
The paper is in 5 sections of which this introduction is the first. Section 2 looks at how 
university rankings are developed and explores, in particular, the challenges of amalgamating 
information across multiple dimensions into a single composite measure from which rankings 
are then derived. The potential effects of these rankings on institutional behaviour and national 
policy are then reviewed in section 3, while proposals for an alternative way forward are 
presented and discussed in section 4. The paper ends with section 5 which draws some final 
conclusions. While the ideas and methodological approaches are of general application and 
interest, illustrative examples and analysis are based on a recent ranking of UK universities. 
2. Developing university rankings 
Dimensions 
Higher education and its institutions can be seen to represent a classic principal-agent problem 
(Johnes 1992) whereby the principals or stakeholders who are interested in the performance of 
universities rely on the agents who run universities to deliver the desired outcomes.3 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that the principal-agent model may be overly simplistic for a complex organisation such as a university 
which produces multiple outputs and may operate cross subsidisation across these outputs. 
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Universities’ multiple stakeholders are interested in numerous and varying desired outcomes;4  
hence multiple dimensions are needed to produce university rankings in an effort to ensure that 
the performance dimensions of interest to all stakeholders are represented. Thus, in identifying 
the dimensions, we need to recognise the principals. 
Higher education in the UK and elsewhere often receives funding from the government which 
naturally has an interest in how the HEIs perform. Dimensions in this context should reflect 
the outcomes most valued by society (Dill 2009). Research and teaching are generally agreed 
to be the main areas of activity in HEIs. In England, the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) undertakes a regular review of UK universities’ research on behalf of all the 
funding councils, the most recent one being the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in 
2014,5 and much of the resources allocated by funding councils to universities for research 
purposes relate to performance as reflected by such reviews (Harman 2011). Similar 
performance-based funding mechanisms for research abound (Dill 2009), for example, in 
Australia,6 Spain, Hong Kong, Poland, Portugal, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland (Hicks 2012). Funding incentives are therefore used to steer the behaviour 
of universities in the direction desired by the government, which oversees society’s needs. 
However, the relationship between research assessment and research output in the UK, which 
has a highly competitive environment, is unclear: while there are some observed increases in 
output just prior to evaluation, these seem to be somewhat transitory, and performance-based 
funding may not actually provide an incentive for constant improvement (Himanen et al. 2009).  
                                                          
4 The difficulties for managers of dealing with multiple stakeholders who may have conflicting objectives is discussed in 
Weimer and Vining (1996).  
5 The results of the REF 2014 can be found here: http://www.ref.ac.uk/. Note that REF 2014 was preceded by 
various Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) undertaken in 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001 and 2008. 
6 See https://education.gov.au/research-block-grants.  
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Student numbers have traditionally determined teaching resources to UK universities in two 
ways: through the university tuition fee; and through HEFCE resourcing which is currently 
linked to student numbers by subject.7 The latter is clearly not performance-related and the 
former is only to the extent that students might choose their university and programme on the 
basis of perceived teaching reputation. In practice, of course, this requires reliable indicators 
to inform potential students.  
A Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) to mirror the REF has recently been introduced in 
the UK as a means of linking funding to teaching performance (analogous to the principles 
underlying REF in the research context) with the explicit aim of improving teaching quality 
and ensuring students and taxpayers of efficient use of resources.8 The results of the TEF, based 
on various measures of the student experience and teaching outcomes, were published in June 
2017,9 and their link to fee-setting in the future has yet to be fully determined. Media rankings 
do not as yet incorporate these measures into their analysis and so alternative measures to 
reflect teaching performance are used. 
The government is not the only potential stakeholder wishing to know about university 
performance; prospective students (both national and international) wishing to find a university 
place also want to know how well universities perform in order to inform their choice. Their 
interests are likely to focus on, for example, the student experience in university, spending on 
areas of primary interest to them such as academic resources or facilities, and student outcomes. 
It is not difficult to find data on all aspects of university activities: in the UK, for example, the 
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) provides data on, for example:10 widening 
participation rates; non-continuation rates; research output; and graduate employment. 
                                                          
7 See http://www.hefce.ac.uk/lt/howfund/. 
8 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/teaching-at-the-heart-of-the-system. 
9 See http://www.hefce.ac.uk/lt/tef/.  
10 Source: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/performance-indicators accessed 17th July 2017. 
7 
 
 
   
 
Additional data can also be derived (from both HESA and other sources) to reflect feedback 
from current students, or the reputation of the institution.  
University rankings published by the media are typically based on data from a variety of 
sources and covering various dimensions. The Complete University Guide, for example, bases 
its rankings on the following 10 dimensions:11 entry standards; student satisfaction; research 
assessment; research intensity; graduate prospects; student-staff ratio; academic services 
spend; facilities spend; good honours; and degree completion. The Times (and Sunday Times) 
and The Guardian use similar (but not identical) measures, with The Guardian focussing only 
on teaching-related activity (see table 1 for more detail). These national rankings with their 
attention to teaching (as well as, or rather than, research) contrast with international rankings 
where the focus is predominantly on research (see table 1). The latter may therefore be seen 
more as reflecting reputation or prestige, while the rankings which include teaching-related 
indicators might provide an indication of more general performance. 
Table 1 here 
The performance of individual HEIs might well vary across different measures, and so 
numerous dimensions lead to problems of evaluation and interpretation (Johnes 1996). The 
measures used in creating rankings are themselves open to critique (Dill and Soo 2005), and 
have been challenged on the basis  that their choice is determined more by their availability 
than by reasons of reflecting excellence in performance (Locke et al. 2008). Moreover, many 
national-level rankings incorporate both teaching- and research-related measures; yet if 
teaching and research are not closely related (Marginson and Wende 2007), the construction of 
a single index based on measures reflecting both is questionable. 
                                                          
11 Source: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/methodology/ accessed 17th July 2017. 
Note that this particular university guide is chosen purely for illustrative purposes; conclusions from any analysis 
presented here can be generalised across all university guides. 
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A simple rank correlation of the 10 measures underpinning The Complete University Guide 
(2018) illustrates the difficulties of deriving a consistent picture of performance from 10 
potentially disparate measures (see table 2). Although the majority of indicators are highly 
correlated, 12 pairs have a correlation coefficient which is not significantly different from zero 
at conventional significance levels. Thus a university’s position in the ranking can change 
radically depending on which indicator is used: one HEI (ranked 54 overall), for example, is 
ranked in the top 5 on academic services, but near to the bottom on facilities. In contrast, the 
HEI ranked 53 overall is top on graduate prospects but near the bottom on student satisfaction. 
In fact, the student satisfaction indicator appears to provide a noticeably different 
representation of performance compared to the other measures. This is not particularly 
surprising since, unlike the other variables, it is based on individuals’ perceptions and opinions. 
Moreover, there is evidence that student evaluations of teaching do not, in fact, measure the 
effectiveness of teaching (Stark and Freishtat 2014), and are beset by bias, most notably against 
female instructors, and this bias itself varies by student gender and discipline (Boring et al. 
2016). 
Table 2 here 
Such differences between small numbers of HEIs can be revealed by plotting the data across 
dimensions in a radar plot. Figure 1 presents a radar plot of these data12 for the HEIs discussed 
above (ranked 53 and 54 overall). Given the definitions of the indicators, performance at the 
outer edge is better than performance nearer the centre of the plot. We can see that both HEIs 
perform well on academic services spend, for example, but there are considerable discrepancies 
in performance between the two HEIs in terms of graduate prospects and student satisfaction. 
Thus differences in performance across the dimensions are clearly visible from the plot, yet 
                                                          
12 Note that the original data have been standardised data to have mean zero; a higher value represents more 
favourable performance on every dimension. 
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looking only at the overall ranking conceals these. However, radar plots, whilst useful for 
pairwise comparisons, do not lend themselves to application across the wider set of universities. 
Figure 1 here 
Weightings 
The complexities of interpreting performance measures are therefore clear. If the objective is 
to produce a single index of overall performance across various dimensions then these disparate 
measures need to be combined into a meaningful aggregate index. This requires an appropriate 
set of weights with which to aggregate the separate measures. The simplest approach is to apply 
an equal weighting across all indicators;13 alternatively different weightings can be assigned 
based on an underlying value set. The Complete University Guide assigns weightings of 
between 0.5 and 1.5 (from around 6% to 11%) to the 10 individual measures (see table 3). 
Weightings are typically arbitrary (Kehm 2014); different publications use different weightings 
(and underlying indicators), yet satisfactory reasons for choice of weightings are not typically 
provided; nor is the fact that other weightings could be equally valid but possibly lead to 
different rankings (Usher and Medow 2009). 
Table 3 here 
The validity of combining multiple indicators into one ranking is therefore questionable 
(Marginson 2014). It is easy to see that the correlation between the ranking derived by The 
Complete University Guide and the original variables varies considerably. While entry 
standards, research assessment, graduate prospects, good honours achieved and degree 
completion correlate well with the overall ranking (see table 3), student satisfaction and 
facilities spend definitely do not. 
                                                          
13 Each performance measure is usually standardised to produce a z-score before calculating an overall ranking. 
This ensures that the composite index is not affected by the units of measurement of the components underlying 
it. 
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Thus the weightings matter and should ideally reflect the preferences of the stakeholders, but 
deriving preferences for a group from the preferences of the individuals who comprise the 
group is known to be problematic, and a consensus on the relative importance of the different 
dimensions is unlikely to be achieved. It might be possible to reduce numerous indicators to a 
manageable number of dimensions, even without any information on an appropriate weighting 
system, using such techniques as principal components analysis, data envelopment analysis (in 
particular the ‘benefit of the doubt’ approach introduced by Cherchye et al. (2007)), the 
analytic hierarchy process, or co-plot (Johnes 2015).14  
The danger of a composite index (and hence media rankings) is that it is typically not based on 
any justifiable model of university performance (Locke et al. 2008). The representation of 
performance which it purportedly provides is therefore likely to be confusing, particularly if it 
poorly represents some of the dimensions that it supposedly covers, or if inappropriate 
weightings are used. This in turn can lead, for example, to inappropriate policy development, 
poor managerial decisions, or to potential students choosing the wrong university for their 
needs. 
Illustration 
Data from The Complete University Guide can illustrate these points since rankings from the 
overall indicator are strongly correlated with those from all the separate indicators with the 
exception of those relating to student satisfaction and facilities spend (table 3). The overall 
ranking is therefore an apparently poor representation of performance to stakeholders for whom 
these dimensions are of particular interest. 
We will investigate further the validity of reducing a large data set to a single index by 
examining the measures of The Complete University Guide data using principal components 
                                                          
14 The interested reader can find more details on all the techniques elsewhere (Saltelli et al. 2005; Johnes 2015). 
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analysis. A principal components analysis aims to explain as much of the variation in the 
original data (the 10 dimensions in this case) with as few variables as possible (see Saltelli et 
al. 2005 for more details).  
The weightings for each of the 10 principal components calculated from The Complete 
University Guide data for 2018 are displayed in table 4 which also displays the percentage 
variation accounted for by each principal component. The Kaiser criterion (Saltelli et al. 2005) 
indicates that two principal components adequately represent the information in the data set. 
The first principal component is mainly a combination of all dimensions apart from those 
reflecting student satisfaction and facilities spend (as indicated by the weights in table 4), while 
the second principal component largely represents the combined dimensions of student 
satisfaction and facilities spend. This aligns with the findings from the rank correlations of 
table 2.  
Table 4 here 
Figure 2 displays a plot of the first two principal components. Universities in the top right of 
the plot score highly on both principal components and so they are performing well across all 
10 dimensions. The converse is true of universities located to the bottom and left of the plot. 
Those universities located in the leading diagonal quadrants display mixed performance. 
Numbers next to the plotted points in figure 2 are the rankings obtained from the overall score 
of The Complete University Guide, with 1 representing top performance. While the top-ranked 
university is in the top right quadrant of the principal components plot, in fact there are many 
examples where the ranking and the plot do not align. For example, the university ranked 127th 
in The Complete University Guide appears in the bottom right hand quadrant of the scatter plot: 
while it performs badly on 8 of the indicators, its performance measured against the second 
principal component (reflecting student satisfaction and facility spend) is well in the top half. 
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At the other end of the performance spectrum, the university ranked 4th is in the top left hand 
quadrant and is ranked second from bottom on the basis of the second principal component 
(reflecting student satisfaction and facility spend). 
Figure 2 here 
The rank correlations between the first two principal components and the overall ranking (see 
table 5) confirm that neither the first principal component nor the composite ranking 
satisfactorily capture university performance consistently across all 10 dimensions. Thus a 
single indicator is insufficient to capture all the information contained in these 10 measures. 
This finding is in line with results of a similar analysis of university rankings from The 
Guardian and the Times Higher Education Supplement (see HEFCE 2008, Appendix C) and 
an analysis of earlier university rankings from The Complete University Guide (Johnes 2016). 
The general message is that, in trying to give a simple overview of performance, composite 
indicators can be misleading. 
Table 5 here 
3. Potential effects of rankings 
We consider in this section the potential effects of using media rankings in stakeholders’ 
decision making. University rankings are generally very transparent: stakeholders are normally 
able to see exactly what data underpin the rankings and the method used to combine these data 
into a single composite index. This should be an attractive and desirable feature of rankings, 
but it is also, in fact, at the root of the potential problems. While transparency means that a HEI 
can easily identify its strengths and weaknesses and alter behaviour accordingly, it also means 
that rankings are open to manipulation by those whose performance is being measured (Johnes 
1992; Pollard et al. 2013) and hence the possibility of gaming.  
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Media rankings are becoming increasingly important to individual institutions: national and 
global rankings can be used by other institutions to identify suitable collaborative partners; they 
can be used by students to inform their choice of university; by prospective academic 
employees seeking new posts; and by employers in the context of graduate recruitment (Saisana 
et al. 2011; Hazelkorn 2015). This means that a university has an incentive to change its 
behaviour in response to the rankings; but the altered behaviour may not actually be of benefit 
to performance – only to its ranking.    
Many of the measures of performance are under the control of the HEI, and there has been 
concern from senior managers of universities that some measures in league tables are 
susceptible to ‘cheating’ behaviour (Rolfe 2003), and suggestion that universities are 
influencing data in order to raise their rankings (Hazelkorn 2015). Graduation or achievement 
rates, for example, can be improved by introducing better teaching (a positive effect of 
rankings) or by lowering standards which leads to ‘grade inflation’ (Johnes 2004; Popov and 
Bernhardt 2013; Bachan 2015; Johnes and Soo 2015). There have also been claims that students 
have been pressured to provide favourable responses to the National Student Survey in the UK 
in order to boost performance in media rankings (Newman 2008).  
Gaming behaviour is dangerous because it can mean that people using rankings are misled. A 
government, for example, might adopt a policy of merging HEIs on the basis that greater size 
leads to greater visibility in the world rankings as well as greater efficiency (Jump 2014). 
Indeed, just such a policy is being rolled out in France, Russia and China in the belief that 
global rankings of domestic HEIs can be favourably affected (Shin and Toutkoushian 2011). It 
would be unwise, however, to base any policy solely on rankings.  
Gaming aside, focus by universities on improving performance as measured by the components 
underpinning rankings leads to HEIs becoming much more homogeneous. Rankings, 
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particularly the international ones, are biased towards research activity (Dill 2009), and  this 
could lead to HEIs altering mission from teaching to research excellence (Shin and 
Toutkoushian 2011). Elite, research-intensive universities are often the ones which are highly-
ranked, and so they become the benchmarks for the lower-ranked HEIs. Indeed, performance-
based funding of research (using, for example, the REF in the UK) combined with efforts to 
climb the media rankings can lead to universities cross-subsidising their research using 
teaching funds (see Ehrenberg (2012) for some evidence on this in the context of Economics 
in American higher education).15 The consequence of this is that there is then a reduction in 
diversity between universities (Morphew and Swanson 2011). But diversity in higher education 
permits more choice for students (HEFCE 2012), and so its removal or reduction might have a 
negative impact on student access caused by imperfect geographical mobility (Kelchtermans 
and Verboven 2010; De Fraja and Valbonesi 2012).  
Finally university rankings suggest a precision which may not in fact be supported by close 
scrutiny of the data. Rankings are derived from scores which in turn are weighted aggregates 
of the components. Sometimes universities can have very similar scores (and hence 
performance) but the separate rankings suggest a greater difference in performance than there 
really is (Longden 2011). This is clearly illustrated in figure 3 which looks at ranking versus 
overall score for universities based on data from The Complete University Guide 2018. The 
universities ranked first and second, for example, are distinct from those ranked third and fourth 
which are, in turn, distinct form those ranked fifth to eleventh, and the HEIs ranked twelfth to 
fifteenth are almost indistinct in terms of their overall score. Such observations can be made 
throughout the rankings. 
                                                          
15 This cross-subsidisation actually has more disadvantages than simply reducing diversity, one of which os a sub-optimal 
allocation of resources to university activities – see (Muller 2017) for a discussion of distortions created by rent-seeing 
behaviour in higher education. 
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Figure 3 
Thus, rankings not only leave the higher education sector susceptible to unwanted behaviour 
and its consequences, but these may actually be based on rankings that have little meaning. It 
is therefore important to know whether or not the differences in rankings between HEIs are 
‘real’ or significant in a statistical sense, yet little work has focused on this aspect in the context 
of individual measures or composite indexes.  
4. An alternative to rankings: Groupings rather than point estimates 
The use of rankings based on composite indicators constructed from arbitrary weightings 
applied to all HEIs is therefore controversial. An alternative method of aggregation based on 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) can overcome many of the shortcomings of conventional 
composite indicators (CIs) identified in the previous section. This benefit of the doubt (BOD) 
approach evaluated using DEA produces a CI derived by solving the following linear 
programming problem for each observation (university) 𝑘 being assessed on the basis of 𝑖 
indicators 𝑥𝑖 (Saltelli et al. 2005; Cherchye et al. 2007): 
 𝐼𝑘 = max
𝑤𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑖  
Subject to 
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1  
𝑤𝑘𝑖 ≥ 0 for 𝑘 = 1….𝑛 
 
Essentially it is the original DEA model (Charnes et al. 1978) with all the variables in the 
indicator (𝑥𝑖) treated as outputs, and a dummy input equal to one for all HEIs (Cherchye et al. 
2007). The resulting index will vary between the values of 0 and 1. Since it is based on DEA, 
the CI derived in this way has various advantages. First, DEA is unaffected by the units of 
measurement of the dimensions. Second, the weights used in the aggregation are decided by 
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the data, and differ by unit (HEI in this case).  Thus the weights are sensitive to the observed 
priorities of the HEIs and the weights derived will provide the best possible composite score 
which can be achieved for each HEI. In practice this means that each university is measured 
against universities with similar mission or objectives, and hence diversity in the sector is 
preserved. What is more, the incentive for game-playing is reduced because no HEI is 
disadvantaged by their chosen priorities, and so HEIs are encouraged simply to act in line with 
their mission. 
A possible drawback of the approach is that many HEIs will have a score of 1 and therefore 
there is an apparent lack of discrimination amongst the best-performing HEIs; indeed the 
precision of any ranking is open to doubt. An extension of DEA using bootstrapping techniques 
allows us to estimate confidence intervals around the composite scores for each HEI, and these 
are plotted along with the composite scores in figure 4. It emerges that in fact there is no 
significant difference between the composite scores for this set of universities based on the 10 
indicators in the The Complete University Guide.  
Figure 4 here 
One way in which we can gain some idea of the performance of universities whilst avoiding 
these problems is to derive performance groupings, rather than point estimates (Bougnol and 
Dula 2006). One way of constructing groups is to use DEA to produce tiers of universities –  
known as ‘peeling the DEA onion’ (Barr et al. 2000): the first application of DEA to the data 
produces a set of perfectly performing universities which are removed to form the top tier. 
DEA is then applied to the reduced data set, and the perfectly performing universities removed 
to form the second tier. This process, or ‘peeling’, continues until all universities have been 
allocated to a tier (this is illustrated in figure 5).  
Figure 5 here 
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The peeling method is illustarted using the data from The Complete University Guide 2018 and 
applying the DEA BOD model to the data.16 The peeling approach yields 6 groupings of 
universities (shown in table 6; universities are ordered alphabetically within group).  
Table 6 here 
It is worth examining the characteristics of these groups in terms of the 10 initial indicators 
which underpin the university rankings, and the overall scores and rankings (see table 7). In 
terms of average ranking, the first two tiers are very similar, while there are clear differences 
(the average rankings rise) for each tier thereafter. The overall scores are typically highest for 
the first tier and fall for each subsequent tier, although the first two tiers exhibit similar 
performance across many of the other indicators including: student satisfaction; research 
quality; research intensity; graduate prospects; staff-student ratio; good honours; and degree 
completion. In fact, the distinguishing features of the universities in tiers 1 and 2 are the average 
facilities spend and the average academic services spend – tier 1 scores considerably higher on 
both indicators than tier 2. 
Table 7 here 
Although no other pair of tiers is so alike as tiers 1 and 2 across so many indicators, there is no 
doubt that tiers 5 and 6 also share some similar features. In the case of these two tiers it is the 
research measures (particularly intensity) where there are clear differences, while both the 
spending indicators (academic services and facilities) show lesser distinctions. 
The average of the rankings of the universities in each tier  are very broadly in line with the 
ranking of the tiers in that the average for the first tier is the lowest, and so on. But there are 
                                                          
16 Note that two HEIs ranked 78th and 126th have been excluded because they have no observations on the research 
indicators. 
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some big differences between ranking and tier for some universities. This might arise because 
of the calculation of the weightings in DEA. 
The examination of averages, however, conceals the heterogeneity within each group. Thus 
also displayed in table 7 are the minimum and maximum values on each indicator. By 
examining tables 6 and 7 together, we can see that the consequence of using DEA BOD is that 
the HEIs contained in each tier can vary considerably in their missions. In tier 1, we have 
Cambridge, Oxford and Durham, for example, alongside lower ‘ranked’ institutions such as 
Middlesex University: the former group might be seen as research-intensive, whilst the latter 
prides itself on its student focus and teaching informed by research. Thus the universities within 
tier 1 can have quite different objectives; what they share is that they are the most efficient at 
achieving their chosen objectives as evaluated by DEA BOD. In other words, tier 1 represents 
the best-performing HEIs on the 10 indicators used by The Complete University Guide, whilst 
preserving each HEI’s mission. There is clearly a variety of ways to perform well – both 
research-intensive and teaching-intensive, and tier 1 encompasses a range of such HEIs. We 
can find similar contrasts between HEIs in the other tiers. In contrast to traditionally produced 
rankings, this methodology therefore preserves diversity amongst institutions in a HE sector.  
This analysis is offered purely as an example of how a tiered approach to performance 
assessment might work in practice. While there are alternative approaches which should be 
explored and evaluated, DEA BOD does have certain advantages. First, the DEA BOD 
approach uses weightings (calculated by the method) which show each HEI in their best light, 
whilst a lack of prior knowledge regarding those weightings means that the rankings are not 
susceptible to gaming behaviour. The presentation by tiers rather than points is more 
satisfactory in terms of illustrating clearer distinctions: those HEIs within a group have close 
performance, whilst performance of HEIs across groups are more distinctive.   
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5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the construction of media rankings of universities, using the results of one 
set of rankings in the UK to demonstrate issues which arise with all rankings based on a similar 
methodology – whether from the UK or elsewhere. Various problems with university rankings 
are highlighted. In particular, a principal components analysis of the indicators which underpin 
the rankings suggests that in fact one composite index does not adequately reflect the 
information contained in the data set. In addition, the differences between universities in the 
table might actually be very slight, yet the rankings suggest to the laypeople who use them that 
distinctions in performance are potentially large. Furthermore, as rankings become more high 
profile, there is the potential for HEIs to engage in undesirable gaming behaviour.  
Many of these disadvantages could be reduced by adopting a tiered performance approach, 
using frontier estimation, to produce groupings rather than specific rankings. An illustrative 
application of this approach produces 6 university groupings with clear distinctions between 
the groups in terms of their typical performance on the data underpinning the performance 
evaluation. The approach, however, preserves heterogeneity within groups, and thereby 
permits universities to pursue their own missions. This has the advantage that the diversity of 
any higher education sector is retained. Moreover, the frontier estimation method is less prone 
to gaming behaviour by the HEIs whose relative performance is being assessed. 
The methodology illustrated here is just one approach to producing rankings which might 
reduce the undesirable consequences of rankings, and alternatives should also be examined. 
What is abundantly clear, however, is that users of the current rankings should be very wary of 
the apparent messages they give.  
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Table 1: Dimensions of selected media rankings a) for the UK and b) internationally 
Ranking source Dimensions Weighting 
(%) 
a) UK media rankings 
The Guardian 
 
National Student Survey - Teaching 10 
National Student Survey - Assessment and feedback 10 
National Student Survey - Overall satisfaction 5 
Value added 16.25 
Student-staff ratio 16.25 
Expenditure per student 10 
Entry scores 16.25 
Career prospects 16.25 
 
The Times Entry standards 9.52 
Student-staff ratios 9.52 
Services and facilities spend 9.52 
completion rates 9.52 
Firsts and 2:1s 9.52 
Graduate prospects 9.52 
Research Excellence Framework 14.29 
Teaching quality (National Student Survey) 14.29 
Student experience (National Student Survey) 14.29 
 
The Complete 
University Guide 
Entry standards 11.11 
Student satisfaction (National Student Survey) 16.67 
Research quality (Research Excellence Framework) 11.11 
Research intensity (Research Excellence Framework) 5.56 
Graduate prospects 11.11 
Staff-student ratio 11.11 
Academic services spend 5.56 
Facilities spend 5.56 
Good honours 11.11 
Degree completion 11.11 
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Table 1 (continued): Dimensions of selected media rankings a) for the UK and b) 
internationally  
b) International media rankings 
Academic Ranking 
of World 
Universities (ARWU) 
Quality of education: Alumni of an institution winning 
Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals 
10 
Quality of faculty: Staff of an institution winning Nobel 
Prizes and Fields Medals 
20 
Quality of faculty: Highly cited researchers in 21 broad 
subject categories 
20 
Research output: Papers published in Nature and Science 20 
Research output: Papers indexed in Science Citation 
Index-expanded and Social Science Citation Index 
20 
Per capita performance: Per capita academic performance 
of an institution 
10 
QS World Rankings Academic peer review 40 
Faculty: student ratio 20 
Citations per faculty 20 
Employer reputation (Based on a survey on graduate 
employers) 
10 
International faculty ratio 5 
International student ratio 5 
THE World 
Rankings 
Teaching: the learning environment 30 
Reputation survey 15 
   Student: staff ratio 4.50 
   Doctorate: bachelors ratio 2.25 
   Doctorates awarded to academic staff ratio 6.00 
   Institutional income 2.25 
Research: volume, income and reputation 30 
   Reputation survey 18 
   Research income 6 
   Research productivity 6 
Citations: research influence 30 
International outlook 7.5 
   International: domestic student ratio 2.5 
   International;: domestic staff ratio 2.5 
   International collaboration 2.5 
Industry income 2.5 
Sources: https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/may/23/methodology-behind-the-guardian-university-
guide-2017; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/methodology-for-the-sunday-times-and-the-times-good-
university-guide-2017-fl6r5vq0l; https://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/methodology/; 
https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/world-university-rankings/world-university-
ranking-methodologies-compared, all accessed 25th July 2017  
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Table 2: Rank correlations of 10 indicators from The Complete University Guide 2018 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Entry standards          
2. Student satisfaction 0.08         
3. Research quality 0.78* 0.02        
4. Research intensity 0.67* 0.14 0.72*       
5. Graduate prospects 0.74* 0.14 0.67* 0.64*      
6. Staff-student ratio 0.55* 0.11 0.60* 0.55* 0.46*     
7. Academic services 
spend 0.49* -0.01 0.58* 0.47* 0.49* 0.53*    
8. Facilities spend 0.12 0.18* 0.14 0.18* 0.26* 0.15 0.22*   
9. Good honours 0.81* 0.06 0.75* 0.70* 0.66* 0.50* 0.49* 0.08  
10. Degree completion 0.74* 0.13 0.70* 0.65* 0.76* 0.54* 0.46* 0.19* 0.75* 
Source: The Complete University Guide 2018 and own calculations 
(https://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/rankings accessed 17th July 2017) 
Notes: * = significant at the 5% significance level. Note that The Complete University Guide uses student-staff 
ratio (indictor 6) and this has been reversed for the purposes of the correlation table to ensure that a higher value 
is consistent with more favourable performance. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Weightings used to produce an overall performance indicator in The Complete 
University Guide 2018 and rank correlation between the overall ranking and its 
components 
 
 Weight Correlation 
1. Entry standards 1.0 0.88* 
2. Student satisfaction 1.5 0.23* 
3. Research quality 1.0 0.85* 
4. Research intensity 0.5 0.77* 
5. Graduate prospects 1.0 0.82* 
6. Staff-student ratio 1.0 0.69* 
7. Academic services spend 0.5 0.61* 
8. Facilities spend 0.5 0.27* 
9. Good honours 1.0 0.84* 
10. Degree completion 1.0 0.82* 
Source: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/methodology/ accessed 27th May 2017 
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Table 4: Weightings for the 10 principal components (PC) associated with The Complete 
University Guide 2018 data 
 
 Principal components 
The Complete 
University Guide 
dimensions 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 
1. Entry standards 0.39 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.11 -0.18 0.17 -0.18 0.60 -0.61 
2. Student 
satisfaction 0.00 0.71 -0.44 0.51 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.02 
3. Research 
quality 0.35 -0.07 -0.14 0.02 -0.55 0.35 0.18 0.60 0.17 0.08 
4. Research 
intensity 0.36 0.09 -0.17 -0.02 -0.48 0.07 -0.09 -0.52 -0.51 -0.24 
5. Graduate 
prospects 0.34 0.12 -0.08 -0.36 0.28 0.43 -0.59 -0.11 0.21 0.25 
6. Staff-student 
ratio 0.33 -0.09 0.21 0.49 -0.14 -0.51 -0.51 0.10 0.08 0.20 
7. Academic 
services spend 0.29 -0.19 0.48 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.20 -0.05 -0.21 -0.08 
8. Facilities spend 0.07 0.65 0.67 -0.25 -0.19 -0.09 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.05 
9. Good honours 0.38 -0.05 -0.16 -0.06 0.12 -0.22 0.52 -0.29 0.07 0.64 
10. Degree 
completion 0.36 0.07 -0.09 -0.30 0.39 -0.31 0.03 0.48 -0.50 -0.20 
% variation 54.5 13.0 8.0 6.9 4.8 3.7 3.4 2.3 2.1 1.3 
 
 
Table 5: Rank correlations between the first two principal components and the university 
ranking 
 
 1 2 
1. University ranking   
2. Principal component 1 0.97  
3. Principal component 2 0.21 0.09 
Note: Data sourced from The Complete University Guide 2018 
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Tier 1 Rank Tier 2 Rank Tier 3 Rank 
Cambridge 1 London School of Economics 4 Nottingham 18 
Oxford 2 Warwick 8 Manchester 22 
St Andrews 3 Lancaster 9 Newcastle 23 
Imperial College London 5 Bath 11 Reading 27 
Durham 6 Surrey 13 Sheffield 32 
University College London 7 Exeter 14 Royal Holloway, University of London 35 
Loughborough 10 Leeds 15 Stirling 39 
East Anglia (UEA) 12 Birmingham 16 Aberdeen 40 
Essex 33 Bristol 17 Liverpool 41 
Queen's, Belfast 36 Sussex 19 City, University of London 42 
Harper Adams 46 York 20 Strathclyde 45 
St George's, University of London 53 King's College London 21 Brunel University London 47 
University for the Creative Arts 54 Edinburgh 23 Aston 49 
Liverpool Hope 59 Kent 25 Lincoln 50 
Middlesex 73 Southampton 26 Goldsmiths, University of London 51 
  Glasgow 28 Nottingham Trent 52 
  Heriot-Watt 29 West of England, Bristol 60 
  Leicester 30 Edge Hill 64 
  Dundee 30 Bangor 65 
  Queen Mary, University of London 34 Cardiff Metropolitan 67 
  Cardiff 37 Aberystwyth 68 
  SOAS University of London 38 Ulster 71 
  Coventry 43 Hertfordshire 79 
Tier 4 Rank Keele 48 Abertay 88 
Swansea 44 West London 79 Chester 91 
Northumbria 55   Royal Agricultural University 107 
Portsmouth 56 Tier 5 Rank Northampton 111 
Bournemouth 57 Liverpool John Moores 76 East London 114 
Bradford 58 Plymouth 77 Bishop Grosseteste 115 
Arts University Bournemouth 61 De Montfort 82   
Manchester Metropolitan 62 Norwich University of the Arts 84   
Falmouth 63 Winchester 85   
Oxford Brookes 66 Gloucestershire 87   
Sheffield Hallam 69 Brighton 89   
Roehampton 69 Bath Spa 90   
Huddersfield 72 Greenwich 93   
Hull 74 Edinburgh Napier 94   
Robert Gordon 75 Westminster 95   
Glasgow Caledonian 79 Salford 98   
University of the Arts, London 83 Birmingham City 99   
Chichester 86 West of Scotland 100   
Queen Margaret 92 Teesside 101   
Central Lancashire 95 Sunderland 102   
Derby 97 Kingston 102   
Staffordshire 105 Worcester 104 Tier 6 Rank 
London South Bank 108 Leeds Trinity 112 Canterbury Christ Church 106 
Bedfordshire 109 Southampton Solent 117 South Wales 110 
Birkbeck, University of London 116 Anglia Ruskin 118 Newman 113 
University of Wales Trinity Saint David 119 York St John 122 St Mary's, Twickenham 120 
Buckinghamshire New 124 Bolton 125 Leeds Beckett 121 
Wrexham Glyndwr 128 London Metropolitan 127 Cumbria 123 
 
Table 6: Groupings of universities produced by the peeling approach applied to data from The Complete University Guide 2015-16 
25 
 
 
   
 
Table 7: Mean, minimum and maximum values of the indicators for each tier 
  Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5 Tier 6 
Entry standards Mean 430.73 416.72 356.24 310.63 305.04 296.83 
 Minimum 300.00 301.00 273.00 244.00 257.00 279.00 
 Maximum 592.00 537.00 480.00 390.00 349.00 321.00 
Student satisfaction Mean 4.14 4.10 4.10 4.08 4.06 4.03 
 Minimum 3.83 3.75 3.95 3.93 3.96 3.99 
 Maximum 4.39 4.30 4.25 4.19 4.15 4.07 
Research quality Mean 2.99 3.06 2.73 2.55 2.42 2.22 
 Minimum 2.21 2.61 1.40 1.92 1.63 1.98 
 Maximum 3.36 3.35 3.17 3.12 2.84 2.51 
Research intensity Mean 0.693 0.731 0.546 0.303 0.241 0.190 
 Minimum 0.100 0.130 0.090 0.090 0.070 0.080 
 Maximum 0.950 0.910 0.850 0.810 0.500 0.240 
Graduate prospects Mean 79.85 79.86 71.94 67.32 64.30 64.17 
 Minimum 53.50 70.60 51.80 43.60 56.30 56.10 
 Maximum 95.10 87.70 82.90 80.30 75.30 70.00 
Staff-student Mean 0.077 0.073 0.061 0.061 0.057 0.057 
 Minimum 0.060 0.057 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.050 
 Maximum 0.097 0.088 0.075 0.070 0.066 0.062 
Academic services Mean 1990.67 1621.36 1426.48 1330.74 1192.13 1087.33 
 Minimum 877.00 1092.00 600.00 800.00 740.00 891.00 
 Maximum 2622.00 2254.00 1868.00 1643.00 1497.00 1227.00 
Facilities  Mean 793.93 649.32 625.41 517.07 480.42 472.83 
 Minimum 118.00 286.00 298.00 85.00 124.00 366.00 
 Maximum 1575.00 1024.00 1028.00 1269.00 694.00 590.00 
Good honours Mean 79.73 80.30 73.51 69.18 68.25 64.13 
 Minimum 61.40 66.00 61.70 55.50 50.20 59.70 
 Maximum 92.80 87.00 83.10 78.00 77.60 70.00 
Degree completion Mean 90.77 91.64 86.78 81.89 81.43 80.50 
 Minimum 77.60 85.60 71.40 67.60 68.40 75.60 
 Maximum 98.90 95.90 94.50 90.10 88.00 84.10 
Overall Mean 826.87 807.16 684.66 606.26 560.79 512.33 
 Minimum 633.00 620.00 517.00 412.00 414.00 476.00 
 Maximum 1000.00 952.00 825.00 725.00 627.00 547.00 
Rank Mean 26.67 25.48 59.07 82.30 99.13 115.50 
 Minimum 1 4 18 44 76 106 
 Maximum 73 79 115 128 127 123 
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Figure 1: Radar plot of two HEIs 
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Figure 2: Plot of first two principal components 
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Figure 3: A plot of HEIs’ rank versus score 
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Figure 4: DEA BOD scores and confidence intervals  
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Figure 5: Peeling the DEA onion 
 
 
 
  
Step 1: Apply DEA to all n HEIs in the data set. Identify 
the n1 HEIs which are on the frontier (i.e. have an 
efficiency score of 1) and remove them from the data set. 
These x1 HEIs become tier 1 of the performance analysis.
Step 2: Apply DEA to the (n-x1) HEIs in the data set. 
Identify the n2 HEIs which are on the frontier (i.e. have 
an efficiency score of 1) and remove them from the data 
set. These n2 HEIs become tier 2 of the performance 
analysis.
Step 3: Continue as above until in the final DEA all 
universities are fully efficient. This then becomes the 
final tier of the performance analysis.
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